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MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment under the Utah
Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1, et

~·

(Repl.

vol. 1977) brought by the Respondents (hereinafter referred to as
"Common Cause") against the Utah Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") and its individual commissioners Milly 0. Bernard, Olof E. Zundel and Kenneth Rigtrup (hereinafter referred to as the "Commissioners").
Respondents seek a determination that the judicial deliberations of the Commission, when it votes upon, establishes, or otherSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wise evaluates existing or proposed utility rates, tolls and

charg~,

rentals or classifications, is subject to the Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1, et seq.

(1977 Supp.).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On January 24,

1978, The Honorable Peter F. Leary, District

Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, after granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues and denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered a final judgment declar·
ing that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann.
§52-4-1 et

~-

(1977 Supp.), applies to and governs the meetings

of the Commission when deliberating, voting upon, establishing, or
otherwise evaluating existing or proposed public utility rates,
tolls, charges, rentals or classifications.

Appellants seek a rever·

sal of that final judgment.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) is a non-profit, public
interest law center serving the eight mountain states.

Its offices

are located at 1845 Sherman Street, Suite 675, Denver, Colorado
80203.

Its purpose is to engage in legal research, study and analys:

for the benefit of the general public as to the effect of evolving
concepts of law on our democratic institutions and to provide representation to assist other organizations in providing legal representations on matters of general public interest at all levels of the
administrative and judicial processes.

Its Board of Directors and

Board of Litigation, which control the affairs of the MSLF, are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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composed of citizens of the State of Utah, as well as residents of
the other seven mountain states.

Its members and support come from

the eight mountain states.
Many of the supporters of MSLF are Utah consumers and are directly affected by decisions made and actions taken by the Utah Public
Service Commission.

MSLF seeks, through its participation in this

matter, to represent the interests of these supporters.

Mountain

States Legal Foundation believes the trial court's ruling that the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1, et seq.
(1977 Supp.) applies to and governs the quasi-judicial deliberations
of the Utah Public Service Commission to be in error and contrary to
the laws of the State of Utah.

Because of the effect that this rul-

ing will have upon the supporters of MSLF, MSLF supports the motions
of Appellants Commission, Commissioners, and Mountain Fuel Supply
Company that the final judgment of the trial court be reversed and
that this court declare that, as a matter of law, said adjudicatory
functions of the Commission are not within the purview of the Utah
Open and Public Meetings Act.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus Curiae agrees with and adopts the statement of facts set
forth in the briefs of Appellants.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ARE
QUASI-JUDICIAL

The question before this Court is whether the Commission must
open its deliberations and decision making process to the public.
In essence, must the Commission open its collective thought processe:
its collective reasoning used in deciding a particular case, its

we~

ing of evidence and witness credibility to public and political scrutiny and influence.
The result which the Commission seeks, and which MSFL supports,
is only that the judicial deliberations of the Commission not be
subject to the open meetings act.

The Commission encourages public

participation in Commission hearings, where the evidence and the
testimony on which the Corrunssion bases its decision is proffered.
Only when the Commission seeks to evaluate the evidence and testimony, weighing the credibility and probative value of testimony and
evidence, does the Commission seek refuge from the public eye.
Exempting these deliberations from the Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act does not mean that Commission decisions will be based
on improper considerations.

The Commission, just as a trial court,

must enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgments and
Orders based thereon.

Final actions of the Commission are taken

pursuant to written, well reasoned opinions.
may dissent in separate written opinions.

Individual Commissione:

The factors which the

Co~

mission finds controlling are there enumerated and their conclusion
based upon those factors is stated.

The Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

dure are applicable to the review of Commission cases.

54-7-16 U.c.:
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(Repl. Vol. 1974).

The limited exemption sought serves only to

allow the Commission to reach a conclusion with complete candor
among themselves, the same candor guaranteed a judge or jury acting as fact finder.

The importance of the availability of this

internal candor is apparent when it is realized that the Commission's functions in this area are essentially judicial.
The judicial character of the Commission has been recognized
in Utah.

In Wycoff Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d

123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962), this Court succinctly stated that:
There is no question that in performing its multivarious duties in franchising and regulating public
utilities the Commission is required to and does
perform some functions of a judicial or quasijudicial nature; • • . (369 P.2d at 285).
The conclusion reached in the Wycoff case is apparent from the procedures used by the Commission.

The Commission adjudicates parti-

cular matters, with each franchise or rate adjustment being a
separate proceeding before the Commission.

The parties to these

proceedings file pleadings, complaints and answers raising issues of
fact and law.

The Commission has subpoena power and discovery pro-

cesses are open to counsel representing the

par~ies.

The Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure and Utah Rules of Evidence are applicable, though
the hearsay rule is somewhat relaxed. Counsel may represent parties
before the Commission, engaging in oral argument with direct and
cross examination and submitting written briefs.

The competency of

witnesses are judged in accordance with judicially accepted principles.
The Commission issues Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as does
a judicial body.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Only when the Commission seeks to deliberate upon issues of fac·

I

and law, which have been presented to it in the classic adversary
format, does the Commission seeks exemption from the Open and Public
Heetings Act.

Deference to the property rights of the utility and

i

its shareholders require the utmost regard, and the individual natura
of these determinations reaffirms the judicial nature of these proceedings.
Specifically, the Legislature, in separating the functions of
the Department of Business Regulations and the quasi-judicial and
rule making function of the Commission, has recognized the distinct
nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and the need to insulate those
proceedings from any outside influence:
The Public Service Commission shall not be subject
to the jurisdictlon of the Executive Director of
Business Regulation in regard to the exercise of
its quasi-judicial or rule making functions within
the Department . • . The Public Service Commission
shall exercise all quasi-judicial and rule making
powers in regards to public utilities as provided
in Title 54.
(Utah Code Ann. §13-1-1. 3 (Repl.
Vol. 1973).
The above quoted section illustrates that the Legislature not
only recognizes the quasi-judicial function of the Commission, but
also that the Legislature recognizes the need to insulate that func·
tion from any possible taint of influence.
ation is inherent in judicial processes.

The need for such

insu~

That the Commission exer-

cises judicial proceedings is clear from the definition given to

s~

proceedings by the Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona Press Club, Inc.
v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, Div. 1, 113 Ariz. 545, 558 P.2d 697
(1976):
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The procedures prescribed by the statute and
followed by the Board of Tax Appeals in hearing
the parties in open forum, taking the matter under
advisement, deliberating, writing a written decision and making that decision available to the
parties and the public, follow the classic procedures of an appellate court in making a judicial
decision.
. . . To allow the public to attend the
deliberations leading to a decision and to watch
the writing of that decision would not, we believe,
promote the ends of justice.
(558 P.2d at 699).
The procedures used by the Board of Tax Appeals in Arizona have a
direct analog in the procedures used by the Commission in deciding
matters.

Each follow the format of a court of law.

The goal of each

is a decision regarding a particular matter, based on evidence and
testimony received regarding that matter.

The Board of Tax Appeals,

as the Commission here, seeks only to deliberate on and write the
decision without constant publicity and sensationalism.

Only the

interim thought processes of the Commission are not open to the
public; the conclusions and the reasoning of the Commission are contained in final written decisions.
The characterization by Common Cause of the Commission as merely
an extension of the Legislature is not convincing.

Admittedly, the

Commission has been delegated the task of setting utility rates and
granting franchises.

However, analysis cannot end here, ignoring as

it would the essential nature of the Commission's adjudicatory duties.
The Legislature decided that the Commission's decision would be
arrived at judicially, as opposed to legislatively.

The Legislature

provided that those quasi-judicial functions of the Commission would
be insulated from influence from other divisions of the Department of
Business Regulation.

Utah Code Ann. §13-1-1.3 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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This legislative recognition of the quasi-judicial nature of the
Commission precludes Common Cause from arguing otherwise.

The deli-

berations of the Commission are quasi-judicial.
II.

(A)

TH~ OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT OF 1977
EXEMPTS JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS IT MUST TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL

THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO
DELIBERATIONS OF AN AGENCY ACTING AS A QUASIJUDICIAL BODY.

The above discussion establishes that the Commission acts as
a quasi-judicial body when deliberating on the setting of rates or
the granting of franchises.

Common Cause argues that even should

the Commission be considered a quasi-judicial body, its deliberatior.:
must still be open to the public under the Open and Public Meetings
Act.

Neither the structure of the Open and Public Meetings Act nor

analogous case law supports this position.
The Open and Public Meetings Act was originally passed in 1955,
and extensively amended in 1977.

Common Cause argues that this

amendment effectuated an absolute and blanket right in the public
to attend any "public" meeting, regardless of the particular function being performed.
this position.

However, a review of the Act does not suppor:

Public agency meetings covered by the Act are enumer·

ated in the definition section, Utah Code Ann. §52-4-2 (Supp. 1977).
That section provides, in subparagraph (2), that the meetings of a
public agency covered by the statute apply only when the public
agency is sitting as an "administrative, advisory, executive or
legislative body of the state or its political subdivision .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Legislature specifically omitted including a public agency acting in a quasi-judicial function within the purview of the Act.

This

omission must be given effect, exempting the Commission when it exercises its judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Supportive of this construction is the fact that the Commission has always deliberated in private.

The initial Open and Public

Meeting Act was passed in 1955 and the Commission continued to deliberate in private after passage of that Act.

This Court must assume

that the 1977 Legislature was aware of this Commission practice when
it amended the Open and Public Meetings Act.

Given this knowledge and

the Legislature's specific omission of public agencies acting in a
quasi-judicial manner within the language of the Open and Public
Meetings Act of 1977, it is clear that the Commission's quasi-judicial
deliberations do not fall within either the specific language nor the
overall policy of the Act.
Common Cause argues for a strict interpretation of the Open and
Public Meetings Act, which, they argue, would include the Commission
in its deliberative, quasi-judicial functions.

As has been pointed

out, the specific language of the Open and Public Meetings Act does
not compel opening the deliberative sessions of the Commission to the
public, when the Commission is acting in a quasi-judicial manner.

In

addition, common sense requires that the quasi-judicial deliberative
sessions of the Commission be closed to the public.

The deliberations

of judicial organizations, whether a judge or a jury acting as fact
finder, have never been open to the public.

The applicability of the

Act for which Common Cause argues is inconsistent with the tradiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tional judicial function envisioned under the American system.

The

traditional privacy of the deliberative process is a necessary concomitant of the candor which is required for effective interaction
between the members of a fact finding body.

The same candor is

required among the Commission members.
It is in recognition of this basic premise of judicial delibera.

1

I

tion that numerous courts have recognized an exemption to open meet· I·
ings law for judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.

It is for the same I

reason that this Court should recognize this exemption.
Numerous other states have recognized the unique nature of a
public agency acting in a quasi-judicial manner and have read into
similar open meeting acts a quasi-judicial exemption.

Common Cause

spends much of its brief attempting to distinguish these cases on
technical grounds from the instant case.

Technical distinctions,

however, do not remove the fundamental basis of those cases -- quasi·
judicial deliberations require some insulation from public
function effectively and fairly.

scrutiny~

A reading of these cases reveals

that the holdings turn on a recognition by those courts of the analo·
gous nature of the quasi-judicial proceedings of a public agency to
the functions of a court of law or jury, and a willingness to attribute to the Legislature a common sense exemption which will preserve
the effectiveness of those quasi-judicial proceedings.

See,

~

Press Club v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, supra; Jordan v. Dist. of
Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1976); Stillwater Savings & Loan Ass~
v. Oklahoma Savings & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9 (Okl. 1975); and the

pe~

suasive dissenting opinion in Canney v. Bd. of Public Instruction~
Alachera Co., 278 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
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An exemption for quasi-judicial proceeding is consonant with the
language of the Act, the purpose of the Act and case law from other
jurisdictions.

Additionally, such an exemption is necessary to

insure the constitutionality of the Open and Public Meetings Act.

I
1•,

(B)

I

.I
I

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS AC'l' BE INTERPRETED AS EXEMPTING THE DELIBERATIONS OF AN AGENCY ACTING IN A QUASI-JUDICIAL
CAPACITY.

The Open and Public Meetings Act is subject to two interpretations, either exempting or not exempting quasi-judicial functions of
agencies.

Only the former of these interpretations will insure the

parties appearing before agencies acting as quasi-judicial bodies the
requisite due process of law.

This Court should therefore choose the

former interpretation, thereby insuring the constitutionality of the
Open and Public Meetings Act and the effectuation of the legislative
mandate.
Due process of law requires a fair hearing before an impartial
tribunal.

The analytical, deliberative function the Commission pursues

in passing on individual rate and franchise hearings, conducted in
privacy, allowing due consideration to discussion of matters of record
and assuring that the final decision will be based only on the record,
is an essential element of this Due Process requirement.

The Comrnis-

sion does not seek to have "administrative . . • proceedings of a
judicial nature held behind closed doors"

(Resp. Br. pg. 27), which

Common Cause correctly states would be repugnant to our system of
justice.

However, common Cause does not, and cannot, argue that

closed door deliberative sessions are repugnant to our judicial systern, as
that
is Funding
the for
traditional
for
formulation
Sponsored
by theprocedure
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
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final decision based on evidence offered in an open and fair hearins.·
The analytical basis for closed door deliberations is that the
decision should be based on the record only, and should not be subject to any extraneous influence.
The Commission seeks the same insulation of its collective
thought process from influence apart from the record which this Courtl
enjoys.

The Commission seeks this respite from the public eye to a

very limited extent -- only when acting in a quasi-judicial manner
and then only for deliberation on the record in order to reach a
final decision.

\

Contrary to Common Cause's contention, it is inherer.;(

in due process that the final arbiter of a matter be free from the
constraints of matters not of record.
The record before the Commission is the result of a full adversary hearing, with any "ir;.terested person" able to participate.
Commission

hear~ng

The

is where parties may legitimately exert influence.

At the end of the open hearing, the parties are entitled to have ilie
matter decided free from additional influence, based only on the
record previously made in the adversary proceeding.
The Commission in deliberating is no different from a jury or
a judge acting as fact finder.

This Court has recognized the import·

ance of privacy for the fact finding deliberative process of a jury,

calling the jury's privacy "sacrosanct" and cautioning that this pri·i
vacy should "be preserved from influence from outside sources or acy
semblance thereof."
887-88 (1959).

Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884,

This same need for privacy has been recognized when

the fact finder or decision maker is an administrative agency acting
in a quasi-judicial manner.

National Labor Relations Bd. v.
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Bota~

worsted

Mills, 106 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1939); United States v. Morgan,

313 U.S. 409

(1941).

The Arizona Press Club case recognized the need

for privacy in a quasi-judicial body in order to assure the fair decision of the matter.

To strip the Commission of its ability to insul-

ate itself from outside influences thereby assuring a decision on the
record is violative of due process in that it deprives the Commission
and the parties before it of the assurance that the Commission's
decision is based only on the record.
Common Cause argues that under the definition of due process
contained in Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945)
a closed deliberative session is not necessary to insure due process.
This is contrary to the elements which Christiansen sets out as necessary for due process.

Christiansen dealt with the hearing process

required for revocation of parole, and the issue of whether the deliberations of the fact finder were necessary to insure due process was
not before the court.

However, Christiansen did establish that:

In depriving a person of life or liberty, the essentials of due process are: [a fair hearing with
notice and] (f) judgment to be rendered upon the
record thus made.
(163 P.2d 317).
This final element of due process, that any decision be based solely
on the record made in the prior fair hearing, is inherently offended
by forcing the Commission to deliberate before the public, where
matters extraneous to the record may influence them and the complete
candor required for effective quasi-judicial decision making will be
inhibited.

To insure the constitutionality of the Open and Public

Meetings Act, quasi-judicial agency functions must be exempted.
WithoutSponsored
suchby the
anS.J. Quinney
exemption,
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parties appearing before the Commission by the Utah and United Statesl
Constitutions will be violated.

CONCLUSION
The judicial deliberations of the Commission, when it votes
upon, establishes, or otherwise evaluates existing or proposed
utility rates, tolls and charges, rentals or classifications are
entitled to the same right to privacy granted this court in its
deliberations.

Such private deliberations are necessary to insure

candor among the decision makers, proper evaluation of evidence and
witness credibility, and a decision based upon the record.

Such

pri·l

vate deliberations are an essential element of the fair hearing before an impartial tribunal requirement of due process under the Utah
and United States Constitutions.

The trial court's construction of

the Open and Public Meetings Act must therefore be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
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